NASHVILLE, Tenn., May 16, 2025 — Two state commissioners running a criminal extortion racket out of public office argue at a two-hour hearing that my lawsuit to topple their “Eye of Sauron” project should be dismissed on procedural grounds.
Jeff Long, commissioner of safety, and David Gerregano, commissioner of revenue, have been running a protection racket for the auto insurance industry since 2002 when they took the sect. 139 amendment to the Tennessee financial responsiibility law of 1977 and by “interpretation” of one sentence worked “public safety” magic. A single sentence in 139 is said to have constituted a rewrite of the financial responsibility law, converting it into a mandatory-insurance-for-all-law. Mandatory universal insurance is a different sort of law than one seeking to impose financial responsibility.
— IMMEDIATE RELEASE —
Mr. Long ran the show alone 15 years, with Mr. Gerregano taking orders. But on Jan. 1, 2017, Mr. Long got backup from Mr. Gerregano with implementation of the Atwood amendment, allowing timely monitoring of people required to have insurance if they want to use the public road in a motor vehicle.
These state citizens subject to having insurance are those men and women with suspended licenses who get the privilege restored only on condition of auto insurance. And not just any auto insurance. They have to get a special type extraordinary insurance called the “motor vehicle liability policy” which is “certified” and constitutes “evidence” or “proof” of financial responsibility. It is forward-looking financial security for those adjudicated as being “iresponsible” in some past accident or court judgment.
The glitch is that Gerregano uses the EIVS monitoring system to create an unauthorized list of insurance noncustomers, and he goes after 6,000 of them every Monday, and 6,000 of them every Wednesday using the U.S. mails, the goal to suspend their tags if they don’t become insurance industry customers, with CEOs and shareholders rubbing their hands together in glee. Gerregano says his program is “parallel” to and “independent” from that run by Long.
Messrs. Long and Gerregano are willing that some must suffer so that the “the good people” may prosper. Those suffering are 1 million poor who don’t afford auto insurance, despite 23 years of “policy” under Tennessee’s state-sanctioned racket compelling them to do so. But the benefit is to “public safety,” allegedly, and, out of public view, to all 250 insurance companies in the Tennessee automobile insurance plan. They pull an estimated F$2 billion in “free” premiums from the extorted public.
Below is the automatic transcript generated by the Davidson County court system video above. It’s not entirely accurate — but you know that limitation already.
Highlights next week that you can read.
Would you be willing to spring for the court reporter’s official transcript? Several hundred dollars.
Transcript in State of Tennessee ex rel Tulis v. Long hearing May 16, 2025
This is Part 2, the Davidson County Chancery Court is now in session. All persons having businesses through the court draw near, Give attention, ye shall be heard.
God save the United States, the great state of Tennessee and this honorable court. Chancellor Anne Martin presiding. We are here in the matter of David Tulis versus David Gerregano.
4:00
Good afternoon.
4:02
Thank you all for coming at this specially set time.
4:06
This way you didn't have to wait and sit through a whole bunch of other stuff.
4:10
So glad you all are here.
4:12
We have a number of motions in this case today.
4:16
Here's the order in which I would like to take them.
4:20
The first one I would like to take is the plaintiff's motion to reconsider and to certify as to the court's injection order.
4:30
The second one I would take up this, the motion for interlocutory appeal, which was also filed by the plaintiff.
4:39
And then the third one I'll take up is the amended motion for taking mandatory judicial notice.
4:51
And then the last two motions I'll take up are the ones filed by the two states commissioners or entities under Rule 12 to dismiss.
5:00
So we'll do the plaintiff's motions first and then the defendant's motions.
5:05
So, Mr.
5:05
Tulis, if you are ready to proceed, we'll start with your first motion, which is the motion to reconsider and to decertify.
5:23
Thank you, Your Honor.
5:23
My name is David.
5:24
David Tulis, I'm the relator in this case, and I would like to start by laying quickly the groundwork for what this dispute is about.
5:35
Proof of financial responsibility is called evidence or proof.
5:41
If there is a qualifying accident, there can't be from one of the participants in that accident, a mere letter under 105 to the Commissioner of Safety.
5:54
There has to be what's called, quote, notarized release.
5:58
If there is a court judgment a civil court judgment or a Criminal Court ruling against someone for a crime in a motor vehicle, that judgment can't be just that judgment can't be doesn't require that that person have merely this insurance card which is one of my cars which is a billfold regular evidence of a motor vehicle of a operator's policy.
6:29
The person who has a judgment against him to have POFR proof of financial responsibility has to have this form.
6:37
And I'm holding my hand, a copy of the SR-22 form which is approved by the Commissioner of Safety.
6:46
102 in the definitions in the TFRL, the Tennessee Financial Responsibility Law, says that motor vehicle liability policy, which is this one in my, the pink one in my hand, is certified as proof of financial responsibility.
7:06
The relator in this case represents the state.
7:10
He is relating the grievance of the state against the respondents.
7:14
Long and Gerregano are not defendants, they're respondents.
7:18
They want dismissal of the complaint because they don't want to have to respond to the claims of the law laid out therein.
7:27
I am a member of the public.
7:29
I'm a good citizen, I'm an excellent driver.
7:33
There is no accident that's in my record.
7:36
I have a good driving record and there's no judgement against me, civil or criminal.
7:41
And my circumstances personal are poverty and I cannot comply with the extortion of these two departments and the bagman demanding that I buy insurance because I can't afford it.
7:58
Not only can I not afford it as the relay for identifying with 1,000,000 people who don't have insurance, I'm not required to have to have it.
8:12
The court's duty is to execute judgment in the morning and deliver him who is plundered out of the hand of the oppressor.
8:22
That's out of Jeremiah 20.
8:23
One, the people speak clearly in Tennessee financial responsibility law, there's a line between security and liberty.
8:35
The General Assembly drew a line, and we'll call that the Tennessee Financial Responsibility law, the TFRL.
8:43
There is no mandatory insurance under financial responsibility.
8:50
The respondents are pushing the line past where the General Assembly put it.
8:57
They are moving the landmark, which is a harm to equity.
9:02
Long and Gerregano use general terms in speaking of the controversy.
9:09
I speak in highly, highly articulate, very specific citations to the law as to what's required in it.
9:15
And the suggestion should be, from the way they're handling their case, that they are bespeaking fraud and conniving.
9:23
I articulate the law in detail.
9:26
The people have spoken about this issue on insurance and who has to have insurance.
9:33
They spoke in 1948 when the law took effect without gravel in their mouths.
9:42
And they spoke to the two commissioners who are respondents in this case.
9:46
The commissioners need to get some warm water and rub their eyes out so they can see.
9:51
They need to get a Q tip and clear the wax out of their ears so they can hear what the law has to say, which is what I'm doing here — bringing the law to them, insisting on the law.
10:07
The court has jurisdiction over this case and the jurisdiction is because of the unworkability of the program that they are running.
10:22
I have a right to be heard under Constitution Article 1, section 17 that all courts shall be shall be open.
10:30
No man in in Section 8 says no man shall be dessiezed of his liberties or privileges or outlawed but by judgment of peers or law of the land.
10:40
I've been outlawed effectively without a proper judgment and without the means of making redress.
10:46
Theirs is an arbitrary and capricious program that denies these rights and denies the proper function of the government.
10:57
The Constitution and the law limit how the state created by the sovereigns in Article 1, Section 1 and 2 will allow their servants to be sued and in the regular operation of government.
11:14
This case is denying the ordinary route, the ordinary steps that a person like me can have for redress.
11:25
Section one O 3, that's 5512.
11:27
One O 3 puts hearings under Long, Commissioner Long.
11:32
And it says that he, quote, shall provide for hearings upon request of persons aggrieved by orders or acts of the commissioner, unquote.
11:42
Well, which commissioner is that?
11:44
That's safety.
11:45
Why?
11:46
Because he is in charge of all decisions in the entire chapter.
11:50
12 there his doing.
11:53
He gives hearings, he shall provide for hearings in safety, department of safety, of a person aggrieved of his orders or acts.
12:06
That's how the process is supposed to work.
12:09
214 in Atwood says there is no change in the requirements with the amendment to the law.
12:17
Hearings remain in one O in safety under 1O3. 1O3 controls because Atwood did not change the requirement that parties under who are aggrieved by Safety Commissioner Long have hearings before him.
12:37
Commissioner Long, Long and Gerregano disobey this requirement.
12:43
Title 67, which Gerregano overseas in the tax code, has no authority here when there's specific reference to the TFRL and how disputes are handled in the normal operation of law and government.
13:04
My only option that I have pursued for 660 days in department revenue in a contested case is futile as a matter of law.
13:15
It is futile because Gerregano and his department can't hear that case.
13:28
They are frustrating —
13:29
the two of them — protected due process rights.
13:36
How can I appeal when my tag was revoked to to Mr.
13:38
Long?
13:39
How can I do that?
13:40
He didn't directly speak to me.
13:43
He did not send me any notices.
13:46
He did not send the notice of revocation that came from Commissioner Gerregano with three notices prior, the first of them under 210 being the notice of inquiry.
13:56
I can't appeal to the man who has the authority in this case because he did nothing wrong suggesting that the Commissioner Revenue is running a rogue corporate capture show.
14:11
Gerregano unilaterally revoked my tag as he does all the all the other people upon whom he uses the EVIS system, the electronic insurance verification system.
14:23
He claims, as we heard, that he can unilaterally reregister my car somehow.
14:30
Well, he can't under 130. It shall be unlawful for him to reregister any motor vehicle without written permission from Long.
14:43
And the fact witness Jennifer Landfair in the transcript says that, “No, we don't need to talk with Department of Safety.” Contested cases like the one I'm in right now in revenue awaiting Christine Lapps, deputy commissioner, to rule to issue a final order. Contested cases are how government is supposed to operate.
15:10
That is the normal way to sue the state. Colonial Pipeline versus Morgan 263 SW 3rd a 27 2008 case explains the process.
15:22
It goes into good detail.
15:23
Also the case Richardson versus.
15:33
Tennessee Board of Dentistry, that's 9913 SW 2nd 446.
15:40
Both explain where and how the authority is distributed, how constitutional problems are dealt with.
15:47
When there is an agency action and there is a member of the public making petition.
15:54
The court has authority to hear this case.
15:57
Because I don't have a remedy, I'm being denied my due process rights to have a remedy.
16:06
The Richardson case is about, quote, unconstitutional applications of a statute or rule.
16:16
And it lays out three ways that agencies can deal with with the question of suing the state and how is the state to be addressed in its actions upon the members of the public.
16:31
Quote, an agency's procedure there, there can be a case.
16:35
Quote, if an agency's procedure is constitutionally deficient, there's a question of facial unconstitutionality claims or as applied constitutionality claims in that in that ruling or whether an appellant or a petitioner is suing over over a mere a mere interpretation of a rule.
16:58
You know, if the rule is bad, that can be handled in agency and the agency in this benevolent system of the administrative state can correct itself when the challenge is made.
17:09
The the way one thing or two things are done regarding a rule and a petition or a member of the public who's subject to that agency for some some matter under privilege longing the oregano legislate, however, an entirely new law which is forbidden under the division of powers.
17:31
They're using sections 139 and 210.
17:36
The venue in revenue is not authorized and all it can all misses labs can do as far as the legal claims go would be issue a void judgement, a void ruling, a classic void ruling under 60O2 when there's a void matter thrown up for appeal, meaning that is the law operates.
18:04
I can't appeal my case under 45322 under the judicial review sections.
18:15
I have a a right to relief here.
18:19
The court must make the respondents show cause about their program and respond to the law.
18:27
So the court has subject matter jurisdiction, which I I bring up.
18:37
I bring up as a point regarding my request that you reconsider your order denying injunction.
18:59
The motion for interlocutory appeal, Your Honor, goes into this question further at that's already in the motion to reconsider and to be certified.
19:17
I'm asking that the injunction be granted that will stop 3000 letters going out to poor people on Monday.
19:26
And no, I'm sorry, 6000 letters going out from DORS contractor I3 verticals on Monday and 6000 on Wednesday.
19:37
These are people who don't have insurance.
19:40
Maybe some are well to do folks who just want to live riskily, but others are just poor people.
19:46
They they don't have the means to purchase it.
19:49
They opt instead for groceries, car repair, daycare, rent, heat or cooling and those kinds of things.
20:00
The two motions that I have before you to reconsider and decertify an interlocutory make the same argument.
20:08
Interlocutory asks you to to get permission for the Court of Appeals to look at the law itself, and I make that motion.
20:22
As as backup the the interlocutory order you're seeking to appeal is by denial of the injunction.
20:28
Yes, ma'am.
20:29
OK.
20:29
Yes, your honor.
20:35
Why should injunction issue and how should the court view the law?
20:41
The court in the order accepts that EVIS is certified in 212 because the Commissioner of Revenue has to certify EVIS before it can operate and it be used by any police official or deputy or trooper.
21:00
But the court rejects that EVIS is to monitor motor vehicle liability policies that are the pink SR22 form.
21:14
That's the form that EVIS is to monitor.
21:18
And because the system is certified without being moved by the court, it continues to not look at these exclusively.
21:28
But it looks at, as I hold back in my hand again, the ordinary insurance person who has insurance, that's what EVAS looks at, not exclusively the SR22 motor vehicle liability policy that is certificated and defined in 2O2.
21:49
And the contents of those policies are strictly outlined by statute in in 120 and 122.
22:00
So if the court is unwilling or find itself that it can't make a determination of what the law says, as this is a law case, there are no facts in dispute, no material facts if if the court can't read the law with the aid of the parties.
22:19
And I would say I'm the one helping the court understand what the law actually says.
22:24
Then interlocutory would be a proper petition to make.
22:28
But I believe the court has full ability to, to do that, to read the law and, and to understand it.
22:36
That's, that's the, the this case empowers this court and makes it a duty to read and understand a law that very few people have ever read.
22:47
I'm one of the few people that have read it.
22:49
And that would be 5512 one O 1 at seek and 5512 two O 1 at seek.
22:55
There's not, I suggest, a limited record as the court's order and the court's quoted comments indicate, a limited record or talking about stages of the litigation.
23:11
That that all assumes that other things are going to develop downstream down in the calendar.
23:17
As I can see it, Your Honor, there's nothing else to look at except what does the law say.
23:24
The complaint complained of by Mr.
23:28
Barker and the Commissioner of Revenue is over long.
23:33
And my my brief supporting the injunction, which goes into detail of all the provisions talking about the motor vehicle liability policy, with all that legal analysis open for the Court's inspection, I suggest there's no reason that the law should be seen as remote or skimpy or called a limited record.
23:57
There's no when the law is there and that's all that's an issue.
24:01
There can't be a limited record.
24:06
I'm raising fundamental doubts in my complaint on Gerrigano's certification under 212 of the EVIS reliability.
24:22
However, the order that I'm appealing from your hand sees absolute certainty in leaving it as it is, that it is a truthful report of compliance with law, that it represents integrity compliance.
24:40
There are no doubts about it.
24:43
One is confidence in the certification.
24:47
A certification is supposed to imply that there can't be any doubt about the validity of what's written on the page.
24:56
To deny injunction or to deny interlocutory appeal has the court saying, well, there's no irregularity, there's no harm and and we, I Chancellor Court, don't have any doubts.
25:16
But to have that position requires the court to ignore 29 abrogations of law that I have put in detail like in summary in the complaint.
25:25
The complaint has 29 abrogation of law and contradictions summarized and I think it deals with six in some detail.
25:34
But anyone should be enough to show the court that these two commissioners are running a mass fraud upon the public.
25:47
One O 3 is the starting point.
25:49
If you, if you, if you're pressed for time, have too much on your docket, you're swamped in your office.
25:55
Start at One O 3 and ask, does that passage control the chapter commissioner Long controls everything that happens in financial responsibility, Chapter 12.
26:06
It's up to him.
26:07
There is in the court's order and the possible unwillingness to to to remand the order a presumption of compliance and the court accepts admitted deviation that are admit that are filed by both sides.
26:25
The other the other side.
26:26
The commissioner talks about Commissioner Giordano's self styled independent and parallel program.
26:33
That's from brand Buchanan's order, his 60 some page order against my van getting his tag back.
26:45
Revenue ignores Part 1 entirely except for 1:39 with its magical sentence in paragraph A, the very first sentence, which is construed as imposing a universal obligation for all to have general automotive insurance to not remand your order except the overthrow of generics.
27:15
Adjust them.
27:16
Which is the rule that says the general provision in a body of law is narrowed by the context.
27:26
In other words, reading in para materia, under the rules of construction, all the parts are supposed to work together.
27:35
My petition, my complaint shows how all the parts do work together coherently.
27:42
The other side, as I've learned in discovering how they operate and how they think in the Department of Revenue, has all kinds of loose pieces, all kinds of loose pieces.
27:52
And we can just put the number of them at 29 for now.
27:55
We don't have to have, we really have to have more than one or two.
27:57
But as a as a journalist and an investigative reporter, I try to get to the bottom of things to to not grant a remand of the order denying my injunction denies what has been by me effectively a thorough audit of the books and records of the department, revenue and the department over 660 days since I filed my contested case and filed also with Commissioner Giordano and administrative notice of how the law works.
28:30
I think about 8 pages telling here's how the law works and those have had no, no fruit.
28:38
The court can't have two minds about the law in this controversy.
28:45
It can't hesitate because the complaint that that 90 some pages raises material reasonable, verifiable substantive doubts about the certification to keep those letters going out every Monday and every Wednesday upon poor people.
29:02
1,000,000 people who use the roads under the registration of the commissioners of revenue don't have insurance.
29:10
That's one in seven who would love to have it.
29:14
They probably would love to have it, but they just and they know they're they're facing revocation of their tax, not for any harm that they've done, but because of this strip mining and carpet bombing of these two departments.
29:28
To not remand the order and grand injunction after a further reading of the statutes would have this court running a program in departure of law.
29:46
They don't have to obey the law.
29:49
These people don't have to obey the law.
29:51
The Court will be protecting a scam which is going on for 22 years under safety authority and since January 1, 2017 under Geragonis.
30:04
The fear of man, I, I have strongly suggested, is in the Court's statements and in his order, but not fear of the law, nor of God or of the voters who put every chancellor up for election without interlocutory appeal or without the remand for my motion for injunction.
30:36
We have continuing corruption, your honor, of the law enforcement agencies of our state.
30:44
Deputies under sheriff's departments, municipal police troopers.
30:49
They are converted by the duty they they believe they have under 2 commissioner, 2 high commissioners from our elected governor, Bill Lee.
31:00
These two commissioners have told these, these good men and women who are in law enforcement, you have to criminally charge people who don't have insurance.
31:08
They become they become gunmen, they become predators.
31:13
They're free booters, they're bandits.
31:16
Shame that our honorable city police officers in Chattanooga and Nashville and across our state and our 95 counties, deputies be converted to that by a misapplication of statute.
31:30
In the time I've been in court, we have 68,000 people falsely criminally convicted.
31:36
That's by the admission that's that figure is based on the average per year over I think 6-6 or seven years that both commissioners sign.
31:45
They sign their names in a letter to the General Assembly crediting their good work with keeping the roads safe.
31:53
And the roads are not safe when the police are used to further extortion.
31:58
This is an extortion racket.
32:01
So I appeal to the court's conscience.
32:06
I appeal to the court ending eventually my my ending did this harm.
32:14
Like my complaint details what I demand that the court order these departments in the way of restitution, restoration, reformation.
32:22
But right now all I want is that I get my tag back, my 2 tags back, and that these Dunning letters upon the poor, often in deplorable personal situations are getting.
32:38
This is straight up felony, felony oppression by these by these two men.
32:42
So I appeal to the conscience and I asked the court to not be impressed or not be intimidated by the commissioners lawyerly kazoozling and deceiving not just the court but just trying to deceive me with their violent their violent program enforcing a fraud that that makes everybody have this when they're only authority.
33:16
Statutorily is the SR22 the pink form in my right hand that says the company signatory hereto hereby certifies that it has issued to the above name insured a motor vehicle liability policy.
33:32
That's the language out of our statute as required by the financial responsibility laws of this state, which policy is in effect on the effective date of this certificate.
33:41
That's what these two men need to be monitoring and that is a proper use of their authority.
33:50
The line that this law, that this law draws between liberty and security has been pushed by them.
33:58
As I said, as against liberty and for security, we have way too much security.
34:02
Everybody has to have insurance or you're not on the road, Buchanan said.
34:06
I'm sorry.
34:06
Oh, no, go ahead.
34:08
Buchanan said that the purpose of the law, Atwood, was to keep poor people off the road.
34:15
That is a damning, damning admission.
34:22
The jobs, the job of the of the commissioners is to keep irresponsible people off the road.
34:32
Since you have sort of gone over into your interlocutory appeal motion, I want to make sure you cover anything else you want to say about that before you sit down and ask you to go ahead and deal with your third motion, the amended request for mandatory judicial notice.
34:47
Rather than take these in pieces because they all are related, I'm going to ask you to address those while you're there, if you have anything else addition to say.
34:55
And then I'll ask the lawyers for the commissioners to deal with those 3 motions sort of as a chunk as well.
35:03
And then we will we'll move on to their motions and I'll rule at the end of the hearing.
35:07
So before you sit down, Mr.
35:09
Tulas, I thought you would go ahead and address anything else you want to say as to all three of your motions that you haven't had a chance to cover.
35:17
Excuse me, Your Honor.
35:18
Yeah.
35:19
The court refers to an amended motion for mandatory judicial notice.
35:23
The motion before the the motion before the course, the mandatory motion for mandatory judicial notice.
35:29
This morning Mr.
35:30
Tulas filed an amended motion, I guess would be prepared on since you've just got it right.
35:38
And he, he filed that motion with the intent to withdraw his original motion.
35:43
But we would like the original motion to be heard because we have responded to that motion and we believe that his amended motion has the same overlying issue that his original motion had.
35:57
And I have not covered them line by or compared them line by line.
36:01
So I don't know how much change there was, Mr.
36:03
Tulas, in the amendment that you filed today, which the State has not had, you know, sufficient time to respond to.
36:13
Does it differ dramatically from what you filed before that was set on the docket that they did respond to?
36:21
Commissioners Long and Giordano have chastened me in my understanding of what proper request for mandatory judicial notice is all about.
36:31
My first one they correctly point out is defective is what defective and so I withdraw it and having since I'm I'm not an attorney, don't practice law, I don't know everything that I should.
36:44
I I did some reading on that and I my new one makes no conclusory statements or allegations or claims.
36:54
It is simply a recitation of the law with with I do.
36:59
So then what I'm going to do is take the one off the docket today that you've withdrawn and we're going to hear another time.
37:06
If I don't dismiss the case, we're going to hear it another time.
37:09
Your amended 1 so they have a chance to respond.
37:12
Even though I appreciate Mr.
37:14
Barker, your argument that you all responded and have a right to be heard on it since he has withdrawn it.
37:18
I don't find that necessary.
37:20
So we will take that off our list of items for today.
37:24
Your Honor, respectfully, normally I wouldn't have objected to such a withdrawal, but one of our main issues in response to his original motion is that you can't file the motion to begin with.
37:36
The rule of evidence does not allow the filing of motions for mandatory judicial notice.
37:40
We cited the case law saying there's no point.
37:43
It's not authorizing the rule to request mandatory judicial notice from the court because the court is already required to take mandatory judicial notice as opposed to another rule which allows for a party to request the court to take judicial notice of other items.
38:00
And so that is why we think the court should actually rule on his motion this morning, because we think ruling on his motion this morning would necessarily wipe out the amended motion by telling the plaintiff there's no point to filing these motions for mandatory judicial notice.
38:16
And that is why we object to the withdrawal of the motion to set for a later time.
38:19
He hasn't set his other motion, so I'm not going to hear it today since he's with.
38:24
Thank you, everyone.
38:25
Anything else, Mr.
38:26
Toulis, on your motion for interlocutory appeal or your amended motion to reconsider and decertify?
38:39
Just my request that the court consider a point of emphasis that 103 the locus for hearings in the entire law is in the department of the man who's in charge of the entire law.
38:54
He has said in one O 3 to be the one who enforces and administers TFRL and that alone since I, I'm in, I'm in agency with no, no authority.
39:09
He's speaking a futile act, which the law never requires any futile act to be done.
39:15
I'm, I'm at a loss.
39:17
I have nowhere to go, nowhere to turn and I've been 660 days without my my tag with two cars that are revoked, subject to arrest for driving on revoked tag and TFRL no insurance.
39:34
Thank you, and I will give you the last word after I hear from the state on these two motions since you have filed them.
39:41
Thank you, your honor.
39:42
Thank you.
39:43
So who wants to go first on behalf of Commissioner Gargano or Commissioner Long?
39:49
We all talked about that.
39:50
Are you going to go first, Mr.
39:51
Parker?
39:51
Yes, you're on OK.
39:53
And so right now we're just talking about his two motions.
39:55
Then we'll deal with the Rule 12 motions.
39:57
And on the Rule 12 motions, what we'll do is I'll let you both present yours because they overlap so much, and then have Mr.
40:04
Tulas respond to both.
40:07
So we'll do them sort of as a chunk the way we're doing these two on a chunk.
40:11
And in your honor, to the extent that these motions concern our motions to dismiss, should we just simply refer to, should we just simply refer to, we will discuss that part of the motion.
40:23
That's how you want to do it.
40:25
I, I'll let you do it how it flows the best for you.
40:29
Thank you, your honor.
40:30
Well, we'll start with the Commissioner's response to the amended motion to reconsider and decertify.
40:45
As your as as your as the court remembers, the plaintiff filed a amended motion for a temporary injunction, which the court denied at a hearing on April 10th and then entered an order on April 29th and a plaintiff has filed a motion to reconsider the the court denied the motion because of the many legal questions regarding the financial responsibility laws, the court's jurisdiction and plaintiff standing.
41:14
The court noted the that it was that there were many questions about the administrative matters, the contested case hearings that were going on, how that affected the court's jurisdiction.
41:25
The court noted that the relief sought by a plaintiff is broad and sweeping and would affect this entire program.
41:31
And the court noted that it was not convinced of the legal claims, but it was not making a ruling as to any of the legal claims or jurisdictional issues.
41:40
It was preserving those issues for further wrong.
41:44
And we ask that the court deny the motion to reconsider because there's no basis for the court for the court to reconsider the denial order as requested by plaintiff.
41:57
Again, the plaintiff is under the misunderstanding that the courts being unconvinced about the merits, the likelihood of success on the merits is somehow determinative of of the case.
42:11
As simply as our reading of the court's decision is that the court is explaining to the plaintiff that there is a very high standard for seeking a temporary injunction right at the very outset of the case.
42:23
And and that's the case law that we've sided to.
42:25
Tennessee courts have long recognized that a temporary injunction is an extraordinary remedy that should be granted with great caution.
42:34
And the successive likelihood on the merits is often a determinative factor and a failure to show that is failed.
42:41
And there are many reasons why it's unlikely that the plaintiff would succeed on the merits.
42:46
One of them is the lack of the court's jurisdiction, which we will discuss further today in both commissioners motions to dismiss.
42:55
But the court was also right to be concerned about the jurisdictional issue.
42:58
It was also right to be skeptical that the plaintiff would prevail on the plans, and it was also right to be concerned about the consequences for granting injunctive relief.
43:10
Now, in response to the plaintiff's, in response to the court's order, the plaintiff again appears to not understand the high burden that he has to meet with regard to his temporary injunction request.
43:24
And, and so he turns around and he starts attacking the court and criticizing the court and talking about judicial ethics.
43:32
And then he goes on and he wrongly claims that the court must construe his allegations to be true.
43:37
But that's a, that's a standard for a motion to dismiss, not for a motion for temporary injunction.
43:41
And the commissioner doesn't accept all the facts that he stated by filing a motion to dismiss.
43:47
We filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, that the court can't even hear this matter to begin with.
43:53
We haven't begun to address all of the merits.
43:55
It's not necessary at this time.
43:58
And furthermore, we pointed out in our motion to dismiss that the complaint does not comply with the requirement of a shortened claim statement under Rule 8.
44:06
So it's really not necessary for us to answer every allegation is complaint at that time.
44:11
But it it's important that when a taxpayer or plaintiff requests a mandatory injunction, well, that alters the status quo and orders the defendant to take an action to remedy the alleged wrong.
44:25
And that should only be granted exceptional circumstances.
44:28
And plaintiff simply did not meet this very high standard to get relief from the court in this temporary injunction.
44:35
And for that same reason, the court was correct to deny his motion and should also deny the motion to reconsider.
44:41
Now, the plaintiff also wrongly states that the court should not be concerned or swayed by how broad or sweeping the legal consequences of an injunction may be.
44:50
Well, that's just absolutely incorrect.
44:52
The standard of a temporary injunction takes into consideration the harm or the effect of what would happen to the government and the public.
45:00
Those are the broad and sweeping circumstances of this case, and the court was right to consider those items in in determining and deciding to deny the motion for temporary injunction.
45:12
So of course, as we pointed out in our temporary injunction motion response and and in this response, that issues of the public interest and harm of the respective parties largely depend on the constitutionality of the state action.
45:25
And since he's unlike plan is unlikely to succeed on the merits, that balance of harm automatically favors the state.
45:32
Furthermore, in joining the enforcement of the statute, which is what the plaintiff is requesting, that is against the public interest because it subverts the democratic process.
45:42
Now with regards to mandatory insurance laws, we've cited to several state court decisions saying that the state has a highly legitimate interest in maintaining, protecting, regulating public safety through its financial responsibility laws.
45:57
And and so the regulation and operation of motor vehicles, including legislation affecting the reciprocal rights and duties of owners and occupants in these types of laws that constitutes an important state interest.
46:11
And furthermore, these financial responsibility laws work when there is uniform compliance.
46:18
And so the plaintiff is asking for the court to enjoin a law that requires uniform and, and, and administers uniform compliance.
46:27
So the fact that he's asking for an injunction as to that aspect of the statute also harms the state and the public in general.
46:36
And the plaintiff has pointed out that this is this is an attack on poor people.
46:43
And he, I think, misquotes what ALG Buchanan was saying about how well the poor people shouldn't be on the road or whatever we quote he made.
46:52
We've quoted the General Assembly's legislative history about what the purpose of this bill is.
47:02
And the bill deals with the fact, this is the quote, with the fact that we have a financial responsibility law that is by and large ignored.
47:10
This is from William Lambert.
47:13
In our General Assembly, 23% of drivers on the road are uninsured.
47:17
We have a law that says you have to have financial responsibility.
47:20
If 23% of the people on the roadways are ignoring it, it's costing all of us.
47:26
There's a huge number of individuals that are simply choosing not to get insurance right now because the mechanism for how we enforce that law is broken.
47:34
And that was in in support of the legislation of the Atwood Law in 2016.
47:39
Seventeen which provides for this enforcement mechanism for the Commissioner of Revenue to administer, create and minister the EIVP.
47:49
So that was what the General Assembly was concerned about was the harm of uninsured motorists on the road harming people who were insured in car accidents and otherwise.
48:00
We also point out that the plaintiff does not suffer irreparable harm, didn't satisfy the irreparable harm elements of the temporary injunction motion and and thus that same ideal holds for his motion to reconsider.
48:20
Plaintiff can comply with the financial responsibility laws by obtaining insurance during dependency of the suit and the cost of insurance would be nominal compared to the $369,000 he's seeking an attorney's fees in this case.
48:36
And we also wanted to point out that plaintiff delayed in seeking relief.
48:40
He he waited 20 months from when the suspension of the Honda Odyssey happened to filing the suit in court.
48:49
And we've cited a case law that discusses seeking injunction.
48:54
You have to do it immediately.
48:56
You can't wait 20 months.
48:58
That shows a lack of irreparable harm.
49:03
We'd also point out that in one of his filings, plaintiff said that, well, if I get insurance that'll move the case.
49:11
But we've pointed out that in in response to one of those filings that in Tennessee courts do not mechanically attach mootness, OK?
49:21
They they consider many factors and I think under those factors it's possible that mootness would not apply.
49:30
And that focuses that.
49:33
That wraps up our response to the motion to reconsider.
49:38
Now regarding the motion for Rule 9, interlocutory appeal.
49:54
There are several factors in Rule 9 for a court to consider when determine whether to grant permission to appeal under Rule 9 of an order.
50:04
The need to prevent irreparable injury, The need to prevent needless, expensive and protracted litigation, The need to develop a uniform body of law, Those are the main factors that are considered under Rule 9.
50:17
Now, of course, we also add on to that consideration the fact that the court lacks subject matter matter jurisdiction to begin with.
50:25
So not only could it not grant the temporary injunction motion, it also can't grant the motion to reconsider, and it also can't grant permission to appeal under Rule 9.
50:39
But we also point out that granting permission to appeal is not necessary to prevent irreparable injury.
50:47
Again, he could obtain insurance.
50:50
We've cited the case law that says obtaining insurance would not necessarily move the suit.
50:56
That's the norm of Faye Pyle's Lynch family case from 2009, Tennessee Supreme Court case.
51:03
We've noted the issue of equity in seeking an injunction immediately, not waiting 20 months to do so.
51:11
And plaintiff comes up here and he, he goes on and on about it's been years, it's been months, years since I originally filed my contested case hearing on the Honda Odyssey.
51:25
And I would ask the court to review Chancellor Buchanan's order in which he details why it took that long to get the case from his original request for hearing to summary judgment.
51:41
And that's because of plaintiff, Plaintiff filing all sorts of motions, plaintiff having discovery issues because he's pro SE, the court giving him time to try to get things correct so that the matter could proceed, The court taking the time to respond to motions that he filed.
52:02
So it was not the court that caused this matter to last this long.
52:08
It was plaintiff.
52:10
And plaintiff wanted to do a lot of discovery in the case.
52:13
Now he's before this court saying this is just a legal question.
52:17
Well, if he had thought it was just a legal question back in the administrative hearing, I think that administrative hearing would have ended a long time ago.
52:24
He would have then filed A petition for judicial review under the UAPA and this matter would be under judicial review by a Chancery court.
52:33
But because it is delay in handling the underlying matter, that's what's caused us to be here at this point without the matter having gotten to judicial review just yet.
52:48
Now, I also want to point out that granting permission to appeal and rule nine would not prevent needless litigation.
52:53
The temporary injunction motion is not a dispositive motion.
52:56
This is just adding expense and litigation to the case by going up to the Court of Appeals for the possibility of the Court of Appeals, then granting permission to appeal and then sending the matter back down.
53:08
After that, we would still have to theoretically, assuming this court has jurisdiction, have to litigate all of his claims.
53:16
So this just adds litigation to the to the case.
53:19
It doesn't reduce litigation because it's not a dispositive motion that he's seeking review of under Rule 9.
53:32
And there's no need for granting permission to appeal to develop a uniform body of law.
53:38
The plaintiff does not point to any decisions of other courts that conflict with the decision of this court.
53:44
We've spelled out how the court correctly decided on the Rule 9 motion, and so we don't think that factor of Rule 9 is present either.
53:54
So all three factors are not present.
53:58
We also wanted and thus the court should deny the motion.
54:01
And we also wanted to know that the several plaintiffs recommended certified questions are outside the scope of the appeal, the denial order.
54:09
And the court should consider that if the court were to decide to grant appeal and deciding what certified question would would go up for possible permission to appeal, that several of his questions seem more like summary judgment questions as opposed to seeking appeal of the temporary injunction motion under Rule 9.
54:33
Thank you so much.
54:34
Mr.
54:34
Barka.
54:34
Mr.
54:34
Parrish, you arguing on behalf of Commissioner Long, Your Honor, Holly Parrish on behalf of Commissioner Jeff Long.
54:49
Commissioner Long's responses to Mr.
54:51
Tulis's motions have.
54:53
I can't hear you very.
54:54
Oh, I'm sorry.
54:56
This is Holly Parrish on behalf of Commissioner Jeff Long.
54:59
You can adjust that microphone so you can.
55:01
Thank you.
55:02
These tall guys went before you.
55:05
So hopefully that's, is that a little better?
55:09
Your Honor, Commissioner Long's responses to Mr.
55:12
Tulas's motions have adopted and incorporated Commissioner Garagano's responses.
55:17
So to preserve this courts and the party's times, we will not offer any other additional argument as it would largely be redundant.
55:25
We do, however, for the record, adopt Commissioner Garagano's statements at oral argument as applicable to Commissioner Long.
55:33
Thank you so much, Miss Parrish.
55:35
Mr.
55:36
Tulas, I would invite you to respond to the two lawyers for the state.
55:57
I'd said earlier that I was concerned about losing long as responded in this case, and that is because he is in a way behind Giarragano, who's in the front in mistreating me and denying me due process.
56:12
So I would state that I would like to reserve my right to amend the complaint if there are insufficient, insufficient factual basis in the complaint.
56:25
Though my response to Long motion to dismiss gives great detail over 14 pages reviewing the complaint itself, showing that I'm naming him and describing what he did or injuriously did not do.
56:51
The actions against me because Long is the statutory authority under Chapter 12 are traceable to Long, even though he, as I said, did not send me any mail of inquiry or revocation that came from Commissioner Giarragana.
57:10
Long is in charge of the chapter again.
57:12
That's one O 3.
57:13
And it says he quote, shall administer and enforce this chapter.
57:19
Long is the big dog.
57:20
Yaragano is the step in fetching.
57:23
Yaragano takes orders, he takes notice, he takes commands from Long.
57:31
These authorities of Long are in one O 310-4114, 130-9202 and two O 4.
57:41
Giarragano is not allowed in our in our government to act independently from Commissioner Long.
57:54
All driver records are with Long.
57:56
My good driving record is with him.
57:59
The SR22 certificates come and go from insurance companies to Commissioner Long.
58:06
When someone is on an SR22 motor vehicle liability policy with its certificate, Long has the record.
58:16
Now, the record may not may not always be up to date.
58:18
And that's why EVIS was created, thanks to the power of Internet data mining and being able to search data quickly on the spot roadside.
58:31
Because some people may have dropped for one reason or the other.
58:35
They're high risk policy that guarantees the public safety.
58:40
Public safety is guaranteed under the high risk policy of people adjudicated as being high risk.
58:46
They either failed after the qualifying accident to make report to the commissioner safety in 20 days, which one O 4, one O 5 authorized him to revoke license and tell Garrigano revoke, suspend the tag.
59:03
Or they have not complied with the duty that they agreed to, to take the duty of having the high risk, more expensive policy with its unique characteristics that I've described in some detail.
59:17
The insurance companies apportion these policies because they are adverse to the, to the line of business, an irresponsible person who's certified to be responsible under that, under the certificate, he may have an accident as $2,000,000, a $5,000,000 accident, even though the the operators or owners policy may cover just 60,000 or $65,000 as they as they tend to under the statute.
59:45
But the insurance companies have to take it, they have to choke it down because the public interest is served in that.
59:53
And that's why those those policies are, are are certificated because they're unusual, extraordinary.
1:00:02
And if that person stops the payment, they'll have to make the payments either monthly or quarterly or annually.
1:00:10
Then the Commissioner of Revenue needs to know about that.
1:00:13
And that's what EVIS is for.
1:00:14
EVIS checks the full book of business under 2O2 and two O 3 of the insurance industry.
1:00:22
The insurance industry gives all the insurance data to Commissioner of Safety and it because it's not entrusted to decide who has to have the SR22 motor vehicle liability policy.
1:00:38
That's up to the government to make that determination.
1:00:40
So it gets the full book.
1:00:42
And the question of this case is what is the search parameter that Long has to operate on?
1:00:50
What is search parameter that Long has to tell Geragano to operate on?
1:00:55
Because Long did not participate as the statute required him to in the creation of Evas and because he is not consulted in any revocation fact.
1:01:07
Witness landfill ever said Long had nothing to do with my revocation.
1:01:11
It was all automated by Revenue.
1:01:20
We have the record that Long overseas and that that record is supposed to be used by his Co respondent.
1:01:29
Garrigon has to use the safety motor vehicle, the safety financial responsibility division, just as he has the records division.
1:01:41
Those records are to be used under his authority as he controls the chapter by Giordano.
1:01:48
So long is part of this narrative.
1:01:52
What's happened is that Long let's Giordano use Long's finger to pull the trigger.
1:02:04
Long is not resisting.
1:02:06
Long is not saying.
1:02:06
Well, hold on a second.
1:02:08
How did you, why did you revoke Tulas?
1:02:10
Who?
1:02:10
Who's Tula?
1:02:10
What did he do?
1:02:11
What did anybody else who's revoked do wrong?
1:02:15
Not being in my motor vehicle liability policy SR22 database.
1:02:25
He didn't help build Evis like he was supposed to.
1:02:28
Had he done so, we would not perhaps be here.
1:02:31
Had long said well, you know, we have a duty to have ankle bracelets just on certain people, which is what the statute said.
1:02:37
Well, you're gonna probably would never have gone off the deep end as you did in 2/7/2017 January the 1st.
1:02:48
The statute says that Department of Revenue shall consult with the Department of Safety.
1:02:58
Exhibit 30 shows that what they have going now has a real, a very real and bitter fruit.
1:03:05
That being 40,832 convictions a year long should not be dismissed in this case.
1:03:14
Neither should the case against my claims against Jirgano be dismissed.
1:03:20
They're involved in unwarranted and unlawful activity in Amity and in joint purpose under the color of 139.
1:03:30
Both are using 139 as their claim of authority with revenue saying, well, we have it all laid out in 210 and two 10s has the word shall send notice and the word and the words shall send notice obviously means that if they shall send notice, then I shall receive it.
1:03:50
And therefore, and having received the notice, I'm liable for performance under this statute.
1:03:56
So my my filings have amplified and shown how the law is supposed to operate.
1:04:05
And it is effectively a, a, a, a false surveillance story.
1:04:10
They're surveilling people who are non customers.
1:04:13
They are non confirmed or unconfirmed.
1:04:16
A list that's generated apart from the statute.
1:04:18
The statute does not envision that long allow a list like that to be made.
1:04:24
The good driving records are to be considered.
1:04:27
He has a duty to to have his colleague in this venture consider the good driving records of people and to consider the clear wording in the statute that we don't have in the master's house.
1:04:45
We don't have baby gates at the ends of hallways or baby gates at the top of stairs on the thought that will you living in in this house, the estate, the estate of Tennessee, you're living here in this estate, you might fall down the stairs.
1:05:01
So we're going to put baby gates all around.
1:05:02
We're going to have all the electrical outlets covered.
1:05:05
And if you leave the house, well, we're going to have an ankle monitor on you because you might, you may fall down, you may hurt yourself.
1:05:11
That's not what the law ever was intended to do, but it's been converted by Mr.
1:05:18
Lamberth and others who wanted to get this thing passed into a mandatory insurance statute.
1:05:25
Had the General Assembly wanted to create what State Representative Arnold Stolz tried to get past using my district in the Chattanooga area, it would have proposed eliminating almost all the the surplusage of what is now there.
1:05:43
All that surplusage in the statute can't be gotten rid of by just saying, well, it's abrogated by implication.
1:05:52
All those all those laws there, such as the duration of the requirement to have POFR.
1:06:00
You're required to have POFR as long as your suspension lasts.
1:06:06
Rules like that, statutes like that would be removed because if you have to have POFR at all times, why would the statute that says how and when and what fees are are paid to come to the end of a period as long as five years That you're under the ankle monitor rule that you agree you the consumer, you the member of the public, you agree to have insurance because you want something that the state can give you a loan.
1:06:32
That's the the privilege.
1:06:34
You get the privilege back on condition precedent of having proof of financial responsibility.
1:06:44
And that's because you are shown to have been unreliable.
1:06:49
You have been irresponsible.
1:06:50
You have not paid a court judgment.
1:06:52
You have you have been convicted of DUI or some other criminal offense in the context of motor vehicles.
1:06:59
And so the commissioner is putting you under suspension.
1:07:02
You are under suspension, but you can have that back.
1:07:05
You make application, you pay the fees, but you have to have the certified policy.
1:07:10
The certified policy is controlling.
1:07:14
This law's focus is that policy, not just the uncertified policy of the kind that I had, that in poverty I could no longer meet the payments for anything else.
1:07:28
On your motions, Mr.
1:07:29
Solis?
1:07:32
No, you don't.
1:07:33
Thank you.
1:07:33
Thank you.
1:07:35
All right, so the two motions, the court has heard filed by the plaintiffs.
1:07:41
The plaintiff, excuse me, is is a motion, amended motion to reconsider and to decertify specifically in reference to the court's temporary injunction order that was entered on April 9th of 2025.
1:07:59
And then a motion for Rule 9.
1:08:01
Interlocutory appeal presumably is a backup.
1:08:04
If the court doesn't grant the first motion, the court is going to deny the motion to reconsider and to decertify.
1:08:14
The court believes that it's order was appropriate for the reasons set out in that order.
1:08:19
Temporary injection is extraordinary relief and the reasons for that order are set out in it and the and the court declines to grant the relief requested.
1:08:30
So I'll ask either Mr.
1:08:31
Parrish or Mr.
1:08:33
Barker to draw up that order because the court has declined to change that order.
1:08:41
The court now looks at the Rule 9 interlocutory appeal motion because the request by the plaintiff is to have an interlocutory appeal of that order.
1:08:51
The Court is guided directed to consider the factors in Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure 9A, which set out the grounds for granting such a request.
1:09:05
They are one the need to prevent irreparable injury, giving consideration to the severity of the potential injury, the probability of its occurrence, and the probability that review upon entry of final judgment will be ineffective.
1:09:18
To the need to prevent needless, expensive and protracted litigation, giving consideration to whether the challenged order would be a basis for reversal upon entry of a final judgment.
1:09:31
The probability of reversal and whether an interrogatory appeal will result in a net reduction and the duration and expense of the litigation of the challenged order is reversed.
1:09:41
And three, the need to develop a uniform body of law giving consideration to the existence of inconsistent orders of other courts and whether the question presented by the challenged order will not otherwise be reviewable upon entry of final judgment.
1:09:58
The court does not find that these factors support the motion for interlocutory appeal and therefore denies that motion.
1:10:07
And I'll ask Mr.
1:10:08
Barker or Miss Parrish to draw that order.
1:10:11
All right, So now we have the two motions to dismiss.
1:10:16
And of course, I recognize that Commissioner Long and Commissioner Jergano have different roles as it relates to the lawsuit, but it does seem that there are is a lot of overlap in both motions.
1:10:31
So what I'm going to do is ask you all to present your motions together and then give Mr.
1:10:37
Tulis the opportunity to respond.
1:10:40
So whoever wants to go first, I invite you to present your motion.
1:11:03
Thank you, Your Honor.
1:11:09
We're here on behalf of here on behalf of the Commissioner of Revenue to argue our motion to dismiss the amended complaints.
1:11:19
And our motion to dismiss is based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, failure to say to claim under Rule 12 for two different reasons.
1:11:28
First, the amended complaint does not identify any statute providing this Court with jurisdiction, and plaintiff does not allege that he has complied with the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act in bringing the suit and #2 the complaint.
1:11:43
The amended complaint is not a shortened plain statement statement as required by Rule Eight, O 1 and Rule 12, O 6.
1:11:54
Now the plaintiff has filed suit regarding the authority of the Commissioner to administer the electronic insurance verification program.
1:12:01
His amended complaint consists of 94 pages and 250 paragraphs plus exhibits.
1:12:07
The jurisdiction of the of the section of the complaint does not identify any statute.
1:12:11
It just discusses equity jurisdiction generally, but it does mention these two contested case hearings regarding the revocation or suspension rather of the registration for a Honda Odyssey and a Toyota Rav 4.
1:12:27
And the amendment complaint also acknowledges or alleges that those contested case hearings are ongoing and in progress.
1:12:39
Now.
1:12:39
First, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the suit because the General Assembly has designated the Uniform Ministry Procedures Act as the method for plaintiff to challenge the suspension of any registration done by the Commissioner, and this authority is under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
1:13:02
The state can only be sued in the manner in which the General Assembly directs.
1:13:06
This is a common law doctrine that's embodied in the Constitution under Article 1, Section 17, and it is also embodied in our statutes in Tennessee Code.
1:13:20
But essentially what it means is that plaintiff has to involve some sort of procedure providing for this matter to be before the court.
1:13:28
No statute was identified in the amended complaint.
1:13:31
All we have are these references to contested case hearings.
1:13:36
Well, we look at the UAPA to see whether he's complied with that statute before bringing the suit and he is not.
1:13:43
Commissioner Jaragano is authorized to hold hearings concerning the proposed revocation of or any other adverse action proposed are taken regarding registrations under 6711 O 5A and that of his revocation or suspension of the registrations occurred under 5512 two 10 and 211.
1:14:06
The Atwood Law, which authorizes the Commissioner to provide notices when there's evidence in the EIVP that there's a lack of compliance with financial responsibility laws.
1:14:20
The Commissioner sends notices to that registrants giving them the opportunity to comply with financial responsibility requirements.
1:14:29
And then if that registrant fails to comply after three or four notices, the statute authorizes the commissioner to revoke or suspend the the registration and issue any fees.
1:14:43
And then under 211, the commissioner is authorized under statute to allow the application for re registration once the registrant has complied with financial responsibility laws.
1:14:57
And, and, and, and they must do so and under both statutes in the form approved by the Department of Revenue.
1:15:05
So it's clear that the Commissioner of Revenue has this authority and it's clear that the statute 6711 O 5 concerns how persons who are affected by an action by the Commissioner of Revenue, how they seek to hear.
1:15:19
And that hearing is a contested case hearing under the UAPA.
1:15:24
Now, plaintiff tries to argue that the Commissioners doesn't have authority to hold these hearings because of the phrase in 6711 O five in the absence of any other provisions and accept as may otherwise be provided by law.
1:15:38
But the purpose of that language is just to clarify.
1:15:41
There are different actions that the Commissioner Revenue takes in different circumstances.
1:15:46
When we have something under 6711 O 5 concerning A revocation or suspension of a registration, that informs the affected person to follow 6711 O 5, which then leads into the UAPA.
1:16:02
Of course, the Commissioner has other authorities discerning, for example, concerning the assessment or proposed assessment of tax or the denial of refund claims.
1:16:13
And that occurs under 67 one, 1438 and 18 O1, which does not provide for UAPA review.
1:16:22
That review goes to the Chancery Court under 18 O one or eighteen O 2.
1:16:29
So that's what that language means.
1:16:31
And that doesn't mean that only the Department of Safety can hold hearings on this matter.
1:16:36
It's very clear from one O 5 that the commissioner has the authority to hear these hearings.
1:16:41
And it just makes sense.
1:16:42
If the Commissioner of Revenue takes an action against you, you should be able to have a hearing with the Commissioner of Revenue.
1:16:49
And if you want to tell the Commissioner of Revenue in that hearing, I don't think you have the authority to do it because it should be the Department of Safety.
1:16:56
You can raise that issue and if the commissioner disagrees with you, you can then file a petition for dutial review in the chance report under the UAPA and you can raise that same issue.
1:17:06
So this idea that the plaintiff disagrees with the commissioner's authority to make this suspension and to hold these hearings isn't, doesn't allow him to make an end around over the sovereign immunity of the state and the UAPA, which is set forth this procedure for him to follow to challenge that suspension or revocation.
1:17:26
And this is a point that we've been making in all of our province.
1:17:30
And the plaintiff likes to say they're saying we can't sue.
1:17:34
They're saying we can't challenge this.
1:17:36
He says he's without a remedy.
1:17:38
I think is what he said, right?
1:17:40
He says he's without a remedy.
1:17:41
He says we're telling them you can't challenge us because of sovereign immunity.
1:17:45
That's not the case.
1:17:46
We're telling the UAPA is the procedure to do that, 671105 is the procedure to do that.
1:17:53
At some point he will get to have his day in court if he decides to seek petition for judicial review of the contested case here.
1:18:00
That's not today.
1:18:02
He's tried to do an end around and file suit here and that's just not allowed by common law doctrine.
1:18:08
Sovereign community allowed by the Constitution, not allowed by statute.
1:18:26
Now and that and, and that's our point about the plaintiff can't really ignore all these things by just kind of going, well, I have common law rights and I have constitutional law rights and the court has equity jurisdiction.
1:18:36
And it's, and we point out, of course that look, this is common law doctrine, sovereign immunity.
1:18:41
We have statutes, we have the rules, but the case law also supports us.
1:18:46
And but I wanted to point out that the plaintiff mistakenly relies on this thing he calls the open courts doctrine of Article 1, Section 17.
1:18:54
Well, of course, Article 1, Section 17 also states that the state can only be sued in the manner as as set forth by the General Assembly which is the UAPA.
1:19:06
Now not in the amended complaint but raised in his reply, plaintiff says, well, what about Tennessee Code Annotated 16-11-1 O1 Our point is that that statute does not provide the court with juris subject matter jurisdiction either.
1:19:25
And we've cited to a case the Lawson case that says 6716 eleven dash one O one.
1:19:32
That statute grants chance report original jurisdiction in all cases of inequitable nature.
1:19:37
But it cannot be construed as an explicit waiver of sovereign immunity.
1:19:41
And that was discussing that was a holding from the Court of Appeals on Rule 9 and lock to repeal, discussing sovereign immunity with regard to the Tennessee Claims Commission, which is authorized by statute.
1:19:54
That's similar to the UAPA authorizing this method of review by statutes.
1:20:02
The next thing that the plaintiff raises the Clairtory Judgment Act and Colonial Pipeline, well, those do not provide him with any Ave.
1:20:10
of seeking the court's review today either.
1:20:14
Clairtory Judgment Act.
1:20:15
Not identified in the amendment complaint, mind you, but just raised in his response to our motion of dismiss and Colonial Pipeline state that plaintiff cannot make an end around under the UAPA unless he is questioning the facial constitutional challenge, the facial validity of a statute.
1:20:39
And as I discussed, plaintiff is not doing that.
1:20:41
In fact, plaintiff is doing the exact opposite.
1:20:44
He is also seeking money damages, which was another factor that Colonial Pipeline said I object.
1:20:49
Excuse me.
1:20:51
I object.
1:20:52
Your honor, the claim that Mister Barker is making that I'm seeking money damages, that is incorrect.
1:20:58
That is a false statement.
1:21:00
The complaint says I'm seeking my legal costs, my lawyer Bill.
1:21:04
But you're the you're your own lawyer, right?
1:21:07
That's correct.
1:21:07
But my time is worth something.
1:21:10
Well, I I perceive that to be damages.
1:21:13
Regardless, I'll look at the complaint, but let him go ahead.
1:21:16
This is just argument.
1:21:17
This is not evidence.
1:21:19
I understand your position is it's different.
1:21:21
Go ahead, Mr.
1:21:22
Barker.
1:21:22
In any event, you'd call it money damages.
1:21:24
He's seeking the funds of the state, which is the explicitly intercolonial pipeline is that he cannot do to in avoiding the UAPA.
1:21:36
So call it damages.
1:21:37
It's the funds of the state now in Colonial Pipeline, the plaintiffs office.
1:21:42
Declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against aging agency officials under the Declaratory Judgment Act from the Chancellor Court without first exhausting its administrative remedies by seeking A declaratory order from the agents agency under the UAPA, the Supreme Court held that a party making a constitutional challenge to the facial validity of a statute need not exhaust its administrative remedies and a suit would allow to go forward against such a statute so long as the action does not seek money damages.
1:22:17
Now, the reasoning of the Court and Colonial Pipeline that it wasn't necessary for the plaintiff to exhaust his administrative remedies is because the agency did not have authority to decide the plaintiff's constitutional challenge to the facial validity of a statute as opposed to a constitutional challenge to the agency's application of a statute or procedure.
1:22:43
In those two instances, the plaintiff would not be able to fail to exhaust his remedies under the UAPA before going to chance record.
1:22:54
So what is the difference between the facial validity of a statute versus the application of a statute or procedure?
1:23:04
In Colonial Pipeline, they state that administrative tribunals have the power to decide challenges, constitutional challenges to the agency's application of a statute or procedure.
1:23:17
And what that is, is that you have the phrase an as applied constitutional challenge versus a facial challenge.
1:23:29
And we we signed it to a case that distinguishes between those two things, the Talley case.
1:23:37
A facial challenge is to a statute that involves a claim that the statute fails the constitutional test and should be invalidated in all applications.
1:23:50
In all applications and circumstances, the challenger must demonstrate the law cannot be constitutionally constitutionally applied to anyone.
1:23:59
That's the facial constitutional challenge.
1:24:02
And as apply Challenge, on the other hand, presumes the statute is generally valid and the plaintiff merely asserts that specific applications of the statute are unconstitutional, and so the statute is unconstitutional only when applied to particular circumstances.
1:24:21
Plaintiff's claim is not a facial challenge.
1:24:26
He merely claims that the financial responsibility laws in the EIVP apply only to residents who have been in a car accident or motor vehicle violation, as opposed to all residents.
1:24:40
In other words, he does not claim that the laws are facially unconstitutional in all applications or circumstances.
1:24:47
At best, he merely challenges the application, the constitutional application of those laws and procedures as to some registrants, IE those who have not committed a motor vehicle violation or been in an accident.
1:25:04
So the Supreme Court and Colonial Pipeline has said, oh, well, if that is your challenge, just the as applied challenge and you cannot, you, you must exhaust your administrative remedies under the UAPA.
1:25:17
You cannot file suit and Chancery report under the Declaratory Judgment Act without exhausting remedies first.
1:25:26
The court further held that if the plaintiff, the plaintiff is also not allowed to file under the Declaratory Judgment Act if they are seeking money damages to be awarded against state officers because such a suit would reach the state, its treasury funds or property, which is explicitly prohibited by Tennessee Code Annotated 20-13-1O2.
1:25:59
And so that's why it's not really important in this application whether it's called damages, attorney's fees, whatever it wants to be called.
1:26:07
The statute that would be in violation by allowing the suit to go forward is 20-13-1O2.
1:26:14
That says you can't file suits that would reach the state, it's treasury funds or property.
1:26:20
This is a suit against officials in their state official capacity.
1:26:24
If he were to prevail on his attorney's fees claim or costs, well, that would come from the state.
1:26:30
It's funds, it's treasury.
1:26:32
So that's also not allowed.
1:26:33
So on those two instances, Colonial Pipeline says you cannot plan if you cannot file suit.
1:26:40
Yeah, on the Declaratory Judgment Act, you have to exhaust your remedies under the UAPA.
1:26:45
We would also note that it's questionable whether plaintiffs actually raising any constitutional claims to begin with, much less ones that are facially unconstitutional.
1:26:56
When this case was originally filed way back in Hamilton County last year, plaintiff filed suit under the three judge panel statutes.
1:27:05
And under the three judge panel statutes, you have to raise a constitutional challenge to a statute.
1:27:12
The presiding judge in that matter said in an in an order, it does not appear that plaintiff is actually raising a constitutional challenge to a statute.
1:27:22
Instead, they're merely it's a statutory construction issue and thus the three judge panel statute does not apply.
1:27:33
The Supreme Court then affirmed that finding.
1:27:36
So we just want to make clear it's not even it's questionable he's actually raising any constitutional claim, but even if he were raising the constitutional claim, he's not raising a facially valid constitutional claim and thus Colonial Pipelines narrow exception does not apply and plaintiff must comply with the UAPA before seeking suit in a judicial review in this court.
1:28:04
Now, for those reasons, the court should grant our motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
1:28:09
We have our second issue, which is that the amendment complaint is not a short complaint statement.
1:28:19
A party may move to strike an entire pleading, including a complaint where it's allegations are in gross violation of the late.
1:28:26
And we cited a case law where the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the complaint consisting of 84 pages along with 131 pages of exhibits.
1:28:36
And the quote in that case was the complaint is a conglomeration of facts, legal arguments, conjecture, grand eloquent expressions, rhetorical questions, verbiage, impertinence, redundancy, immateriality, scandalous matter, any windows, character assassination and affirmative to census to defenses to uncertain claims.
1:28:55
Court still stated that it is not the duty of the trial court or defence counsel or the Court of Appeals to sift through the complaint in this case and rewrite plaintiff's complaint so that it complies with Rule 8 and thus in this matter.
1:29:09
The amended complaint has a lot of the same issues as Collier.
1:29:12
It's 94 pages and 250 paragraphs plus exhibits.
1:29:17
The 1st 11 pages have the sense of a complaint.
1:29:23
There's an abstract, there's a section on jurisdiction of parties and factual background and summary of the of the controversy.
1:29:32
But unfortunately the plan does not start there.
1:29:34
The next 67 pages in 180 paragraphs are like a summary judgment motion and then the final 9 pages and 30 paragraphs describe the relief he seeks now in response to our motion to dismiss plan of claims that the amended complaint is his best good faith effort to comply with Rule 801 is carefully drafted by a professional rider and is sufficient without being tedious.
1:30:01
A plaintiffs believe that this is his best effort is an admission that he cannot comply with Rule 801 and supports the dismissal of the amended complaint.
1:30:09
Accordingly, the court should also dismiss the complaint because it is not a short and plain statement.
1:30:15
Thank you, John, thank you.
1:30:17
Since, as I said before, since Commissioner's Law, Mom's arguments are largely consistent with what Commissioner Jarakano is arguing, I'm going to ask Mr.
1:30:28
Parish to go next, and then Mr.
1:30:32
Tulas can respond to both.
1:30:38
Holly Parrish, again on behalf of Jeff Long, the Commissioner of the Department of Safety and Homeland Security, who is being sued in his official capacity only.
1:30:49
Your Honor, Mr.
1:30:49
Tulas has made many different claims, and these claims can appear complicated at first blush.
1:30:57
However, in determining this motion to dismiss against Commissioner Long, it is important to remember that the only claims at issue against Commissioner against Commissioner Long are claims that he specifically injured Mr.
1:31:11
Tulis and remedies that can address that injury.
1:31:15
Mr.
1:31:16
Tulis cannot sue Commissioner Long for injuries at other parties, namely in this case Commissioner Garagano allegedly committed.
1:31:24
And because Mr.
1:31:25
Tulas respectfully is per SE, he cannot claim any injuries that Commissioner Long allegedly committed against other parties.
1:31:32
And this includes the public at large.
1:31:35
And that premise that per SE individuals cannot represent individuals other than themselves comes from Vandergriff versus Park Ridge East Hospital.
1:31:44
So when you step back and look at that case from the standpoint it's very clear, as we said during the injunctive hearings, Commissioner Long simply does not belong in this suit.
1:31:54
Even accepting the truth of Mr.
1:31:56
Tulis's allegations and his amended complaint, he does not allege sufficient allegations that Commissioner Long did anything to him, and his proposed remedies against Commissioner Long simply cannot address his viable injuries understanding.
1:32:14
For that reason, we request that this Court dismiss Commissioner Long from this suit.
1:32:19
Now, in our brief for dismissal, we state three different bars to subject matter jurisdiction as well as failure to show that he is entitled to relief from Commissioner Long under Rule 8.01.
1:32:33
These arguments are by and large similar to our arguments at the injunctive stage, and we've obviously briefed those in in our motion.
1:32:40
So to avoid subjecting this court to repeat performance for oral argument, I'm only going to focus on the issue of standing.
1:32:48
And that's because I think standing analysis is a helpful tool to clarify Mr.
1:32:54
Tulis's claims against Commissioner Long and to illustrate the fundamental grounds for dismissal, which is there's very little valid cognizable injury at all in this suit, and there's no link or remedy as far as Commissioner Long goes to that injury.
1:33:11
As Your Honor knows, the elements of standing are a party that has sustained A distinct and palpable injury that was caused by the challenge conduct.
1:33:20
And the injury is one that can be addressed by a remedy that this Court is empowered to give and that comes from Wood versus Metro Nashville and Davidson County government.
1:33:30
In a case like this, where Commissioner Giragano's counsel noted plaintiff appears to be relying on a statue like the UAPA to bring suit, failure to prove standing results in a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
1:33:42
So let's take each prong quickly, one by one.
1:33:45
The first prong of standing is injury.
1:33:47
Mr.
1:33:48
Tulis has to show that he has suffered some concrete and legally recognizable interest.
1:33:53
So what injuries do we have alleged here that meet that threshold?
1:33:58
The answer is very little.
1:34:00
If you discount the allegations of harm to the public, to the poor of Tennessee that Mister Tulis referred to because again, he's not capable of bringing a suit on their behalf.
1:34:13
You're left with only two concrete injuries to Mr.
1:34:15
Tulas, which is the suspension of the Honda Odyssey registration and the suspension of the Rav 4 registration from those injuries or those injuries can be further narrowed down because the revocation of the Rav 4 is not a cognizable injury to Mr.
1:34:31
Tulis.
1:34:32
Mr.
1:34:32
Tulis isn't the registered owner of that vehicle.
1:34:35
By his own allegations, that car was registered to his wife, Jeanette Tulis, not himself, and that comes from his motion for preliminary injunction at at page 4.
1:34:46
So at best, Mr.
1:34:48
Tulis appears to have one single injury in this case that can be traced to standing or used for standing, and that is the suspension of the Honda Odyssey vehicle registration.
1:34:59
If we move on to the second prong of standing, which is causation as to Commissioner Long, Mr.
1:35:07
Tulles cannot meet that prong either.
1:35:09
Mr.
1:35:09
Tulles can't link Commissioner Long to the suspension of the Honda Odyssey registration or any registration that he's referred to.
1:35:18
He doesn't provide any specific allegations linking Commissioner Long to that suspension, and in fact, I believe in his oral argument for his motion to decertify, he stated Commissioner Long has done nothing wrong and the Department of Revenue has acted unilaterally.
1:35:36
The only place I believe Mr.
1:35:38
Tulis even remotely alleges a specific factual allegation about Commissioner Long at all is when he alleges that Commissioner Long employs troopers that can threaten unidentified drivers with arrest.
1:35:52
That can't be used to prove causation in that case because Mr.
1:35:55
Tulas was not actually arrested by troopers, nor does he allege that.
1:35:59
And were the mere speculative threat of arrest enough to confer standing, Mr.
1:36:03
Tulas would have standing to sue every city and municipal police office across the state, which this is not the case.
1:36:09
So there's no link between Commissioner Long and any harm to Mr.
1:36:12
Tulas in this case.
1:36:14
The final element of standing is remedy.
1:36:18
To meet that element, Mr.
1:36:19
Tulas has to show that an injunction or stated or requested remedy against Commissioner Long is likely to remedy his injury, which again is just a registration suspension.
1:36:34
So to analyze this prong, we have to ask what are the remedies that Mister Tulas is seeking and can they do anything to correct his one injury?
1:36:42
Although the remedies that Mister Tulas is seeking don't appear to be completely clear at all times to me, he does state that he wants this court to order Commissioner Long and Safety to reinstate Mr.
1:36:52
Tulas's license.
1:36:54
However, he fails to state any compelling authority or evidence that would permit Commissioner Long to do this.
1:37:00
Agencies are famously creatures of statute.
1:37:02
They can only do what they're empowered to do by Long, and there's no statute that says Commissioner Long can or must rescind Department of Revenue's revocation of Mr.
1:37:11
Tulis's registration.
1:37:14
Now, Mr.
1:37:15
Tulis seems to believe that there are portions of the Financial Responsibility law that can entitle Commissioner Long to oversee or intervene in the Department of Revenue's use of evis.
1:37:28
But this belief is misguided.
1:37:30
And the provisions that Mister Tulis sites, I believe they fall from 5512 one O 2 to 5512 one 46, which is the first portion of the financial responsibility law.
1:37:45
And those provisions only empower Commissioner Long with the authority and responsibility to act where there's been a qualifying incident or collision.
1:37:54
And as we stated during the injunctive hearings, there's no allegations of a collision here.
1:37:59
So the provisions of the financial responsibility law that Mister Toulis sites are just simply inapplicable.
1:38:05
This his claim falls clearly under the second second portion of financial responsibility law or the Atwood amendments that state that the Department of Revenue can implement you.
1:38:15
This in light of Commissioner Long's lack of authority over Department of Revenue.
1:38:21
Mr.
1:38:22
Tools, his other requested relief against Department of Safety, fails to address his injuries, and I'm referring there to claims that Commissioner Long should issue certain public statements or consult with the General Assembly.
1:38:35
Even if Commissioner Long agreed to do this, there's no, there's no possibility those actions would remedy the suspension themselves.
1:38:44
And there's also no statutory authority that I believe would permit Department of Services or require them to do this or Department of Safety to do this.
1:38:51
Excuse me.
1:38:53
So to recount, there's only one single issue or injury for standing, there's no link to Commissioner Long or Department of Safety, and there's simply no viable identified remedy or vehicle for Commissioner Long to address that single injury.
1:39:08
For those reasons, in addition to all the reasons, reasons that we stayed in our brief and all the reasons stated by Commissioner Geragano's counsel in their oral argument in brief, we believe this case should be dismissed.
1:39:19
Thank you, Mr.
1:39:20
Tulis and you are ready to respond to the and we've been going for about an hour and a half.
1:39:29
Does anyone need a break or are we good to go forward?
1:39:32
We we might need to the court reporter probably she's working harder than anywhere else.
1:39:37
So we'll take a break until for 10 minutes.
1:39:41
OK, All rise courts, Tenson recess.
1:48:02
All rise, of course, again in session.
1:48:07
Please be seated.
1:48:10
All right, Mr.
1:48:11
Tulas.
1:48:12
Now I'd invite you to respond to the motions to dismiss.
1:48:25
The philosopher Zeno proposed in his mathematical theories that he could prove that an arrow aimed at a wall would not hit the wall, and he could do that by dividing in half every bit of space at that arrow crossed.
1:48:43
So he could he could show mathematically that it didn't get there because you continually divide half by half by half by half.
1:48:48
It just won't get there.
1:48:49
Well, that that's using a mathematical principle improperly in a physical world.
1:48:55
Here we have two men who are colleagues in service to the governor and to the people of Tennessee, and they are in their duties and in their relationship.
1:49:08
They are bound by the law.
1:49:10
The law is the ultimate fact in this case, that law with this description of who does what, who has authority over what, that long is authorized by one O 3 in the hearings provision.
1:49:23
He is authorized to administer and enforce the chapter that's important.
1:49:31
And these these lawyers are saying well that that's not important.
1:49:34
There's no evidence that he did anything wrong.
1:49:36
There's no evidence that he's part of a scheme of mass injury of which I am a victim and have standing to sue to stop both men in their in their office.
1:49:56
And I appeal to the authority of the Chancellor Court making when I make reference to the the Declaratory Injunctions Act, how that that the judge in that case can bring in the parties that are relevant.
1:50:11
I wasn't saying that that was my authority.
1:50:12
I was just saying that is an illustration of the plenary power that courts have.
1:50:16
And this court, if you read Chancellor Gibson has that authority.
1:50:21
It is an equity authority to bring parties in, and I'm not required as an injured person to have to sue two people in two courts.
1:50:31
Both are doing evil against the people in our state, those most vulnerable and everybody else who's under a compulsion.
1:50:42
They're not lawfully to be subject to the relationship with these two men and that one is subordinate to the other.
1:50:53
That is the relationship that matters.
1:50:55
That's that is the relationship that the courts look at, not whether did I present claims of memos passive going back and forth about me or anybody else, but that that's not the kind of evidence that I have to present when I look at what the statute says.
1:51:07
The ultimate fact in this case is what does the law say?
1:51:15
Both misuse.
1:51:16
139 Does the magical sentence paragraph A do what they claim?
1:51:22
Did it convert our state into a mandatory insurance state where you are forbidden to use the road in a motor vehicle if you don't have insurance?
1:51:33
That sentence says this part shall apply to every vehicle subject in the registration and certificate of title provisions.
1:51:41
If that is read according to the rules that I'm here defending, I'm defending the rules of construction and defending the statute.
1:51:49
The statute is not the enemy here.
1:51:51
I'm its friend.
1:51:53
That statute, that sentence does not mean that now suddenly everybody is universally obligated to have ordinary non certified owners and operators policies that that law is about the motor vehicle liability policy.
1:52:11
And since both men claim that that law was changed from the financial responsibility law in its premise, its philosophical and religious premise into a mandatory insurance law, increasing security for all, as they would say, that would violate the rules of construction.
1:52:32
And so whichever statutory rule of construction you see violated, you can start with the main one.
1:52:38
It is it in para material?
1:52:40
Is this sentence read in para material with the rest of the body?
1:52:44
That of law that was not changed, not redacted, not removed as surplusage?
1:52:51
Can we read the law as they're doing it now?
1:52:54
And the answer in an honest court is no, they are not allowed to convert the law and its premise into a mandatory insurance policy and harass the poor with a list of the unconfirmed that has no authority at all in the statute.
1:53:16
There's no authority to match, as Dor does registrations and customer lists that the Department of Revenue forces in that in their process, it forces people to identify their cars with them.
1:53:34
Motor vehicle operators policies are not connected to cars.
1:53:38
But it is an example of one more workaround of Dor to make the system work, to make push all these parts together, to have a system that works so that we can have a mandatory insurance policy.
1:53:49
Every car has to be insured.
1:53:51
Cars are not insured.
1:53:52
People are insured.
1:53:54
And yet in their system, as they make things up, throwing contradictions left and right together, these men are saying that, well, we're we're above the statue.
1:54:13
The case is cited in a way of forcing me to rely only on UAPA, only on a contested case.
1:54:21
Don't address the problem of this course.
1:54:23
Plenary authority to recognize a social and political and economic evil done by Long and Giordano.
1:54:33
It is an evil.
1:54:35
It is a pernicious abuse of everybody, forcing people into contracts.
1:54:40
If they want to use the road, the roads belong to the people.
1:54:43
We all have a right to use them and we apply for registration and licensed because we have an intention of using the road for financial gain with the road being the place of business.
1:54:54
That's why you you enter into that occupation.
1:54:56
You are intentionally knowing that you intend to use the road for private profit and gain under privilege in a privileged tactical activity.
1:55:06
And so you go to these two departments for the the two elements of the driving and operating privilege.
1:55:14
This case, the scope is beyond what the courts have addressed in the other cases.
1:55:22
Holly Colonial and Richardson don't approach the problem, the size of problem that we have here.
1:55:30
Those cases are not about criminal activity, they're not about oppression.
1:55:35
They're about making the government work, making the rules operate.
1:55:39
And so one of them, the Richardson case, makes reference to a procedure.
1:55:48
Well, we're not talking here about a procedure.
1:55:50
We're talking about many procedures on a very, very large scale.
1:55:55
This scale of what I've identified as a public harm is colossal.
1:56:02
It is colossal.
1:56:04
The Richardson distinctions in its list of the three types of authority in in administrative cases are insufficient to deal with this case.
1:56:20
References to facial constitutionality of statute one and then two unconstitutional applications of a statute of rule.
1:56:28
That's the as applied discussion and constitutional challenges to agency procedure.
1:56:36
The fact that the statutes disobeyed creates constitutional problems.
1:56:42
The abuse of police powers without warrant, without authority creates many constitutional problems.
1:56:48
Though the challenge itself may not have a lot of constitutional verbiage.
1:56:54
The complaint may not have a lot of constitutional verbiage.
1:56:56
Mine didn't.
1:56:59
The fact that people are coerced into becoming customers or having themselves revoked for being non customers of this industry, that is a very large scale problem that is a grief that these officials are managing.
1:57:19
I'm not sure which of my which of these three types my case falls under.
1:57:25
All I know is that in this case I don't have a remedy only from UAPA 1.
1:57:33
The venue has no statutory authority.
1:57:35
2 If I prevail against Garrigano in ending this program and forcing the law back into its narrower scope, Long is not addressed.
1:57:49
Long can simply continue telling his troopers and putting out memos to the police and sheriff's deputies that, well, we, we arrest any, we charge anybody criminally who doesn't have the regular policy.
1:58:02
We will continue charging people, though my colleague Mr.
1:58:05
Garrigano has a little bit of grief in court.
1:58:09
You under me here in safety.
1:58:11
We're just going to continue our policy that that's that's not proper.
1:58:15
I'm not required to do that.
1:58:16
Chancery is the perfect venue under Gibson's lovely disquisitions on on this on this court for bringing the problem together.
1:58:28
I don't, I, I'm poor.
1:58:29
I have no, I'm time strapped with looking for work, having work as a as a common labourer.
1:58:38
I can't, I can't do all this.
1:58:41
And I'm I'm asking, I'm asking the courts help, help.
1:58:43
I'm empowering with my complaint this court to bring an end to an unprecedented oppression that is outside of the government.
1:58:58
This is not government operations in a dispute over whether a certain proceeding or procedure or policy in an agency is constitutional or threats of constitutional life.
1:59:10
This is something much larger than that.
1:59:12
So there needs to be a fourth category, and that would be while I'm in agency in good faith.
1:59:18
Until I realized that it didn't have authority, I was there.
1:59:21
I'm still there.
1:59:23
I'm waiting for an order which I'll appeal, but that that's not that's not going to solve the problem that I'm bringing to to you in this this court.
1:59:32
Your Honor, the legislative history brought up extensively in administrative proceedings is irrelevant.
1:59:45
Once it's established that there is not a single paragraph, not a single sentence, not a single word that is ambiguous, then the inquiry ends.
1:59:59
And I believe I've cited that case in our in our filings.
2:00:04
I think it's Edgman Cole.
2:00:05
It's a federal case, but there are no ambiguities.
2:00:09
There is no need to resort to legislative history.
2:00:12
Quoting Mr.
2:00:14
Lamberth is not authoritative.
2:00:19
We don't need to hear him and what he says.
2:00:21
We look at the statute.
2:00:22
The statute speaks for itself.
2:00:24
The statute adequately conveys the intention of the people of this state.
2:00:30
We have the servants, the house servants, the public servants saying we, we're going to do better.
2:00:37
We're going to, we're going to put ankle monitors on everybody.
2:00:40
We, we, we just not sure about them.
2:00:42
We want to make sure they're OK.
2:00:43
And so we're going to suppress any respect that the law gets.
2:00:49
The law respects me.
2:00:51
The law does not injure me at all.
2:00:55
As a good driver and a conscientious citizen.
2:00:58
I've offended no one.
2:01:00
I've heard no one, and I'm within the statute now.
2:01:02
I have not offended the statute in the least.
2:01:05
And here we have men who are saying, well, you're offending the statute because you're not an insurance industry customer.
2:01:12
Insurance industries, as the court should remember, is a for profit industry with CE OS, boards, managers, investors, they're making money in a profession that is sinking in the public esteem.
2:01:33
Regarding the point about mooting my case to say that, well, Tool should just get insurance, that is so cavalier to say that that's the way these people, the 2 commissioners view all of this.
2:01:44
It's just, well, we're just we'll just let let him buy insurance that won't move this case.
2:01:51
We have a Supreme Court case that says it wouldn't be mooted in in a like situation to this.
2:01:55
Well, I would, I would not strategically get insurance having gone this far in my distress on the grounds that I don't want to lose standing.
2:02:08
I have standing, I have been injured and Long is part of that problem.
2:02:13
Long is injured me by violating the statute as much as Giordano.
2:02:19
It is wrong for you to believe that he is.
2:02:22
He has not the the the arrow has not hit the wall.
2:02:25
The arrow has hit the wall and it has hit me in the chest.
2:02:31
They can't explain away by by segmenting everything and keeping dividing Miss Parrish, dividing it into small pieces.
2:02:39
Well, these all these little pieces, we we can't see that Mister Tulas is hurt.
2:02:43
We can't see that there's any redressability.
2:02:46
I'm looking after myself in the future redress ability, lest the court discern that the future liberties that we have are important and valuable, and we want there to be no future ruptures by government employees against the people and against the law that the people wrote to control what they do.
2:03:11
If the people had truly wanted to have a mandatory insurance bill, they could have done in the General Assembly what Mr.
2:03:20
Stoltz proposed.
2:03:20
It would have been another disaster because his proposed bill about 3 pages, but it simply added Part 4 to TFRL Chapter 12.
2:03:28
And it would have been a disaster because it would make it all mandatory, But he didn't do anything to erase the other parts of the law.
2:03:38
The General Assembly rejected that in 19 99.
2:03:42
It hasn't amended out all these surplus provisions that contradict each other.
2:03:48
How is it that safety says you have exemptions, but revenue says, well, we don't recognize recognize your exemptions?
2:03:55
How is it that we can have a provision that says it's it's it shall be unlawful for Garrigano to re register without written permission.
2:04:05
And here the commissioners are telling you, well, it's not unlawful, he can do it.
2:04:12
I think we have had enough in this case of cavalier and irresponsible government by public servants who are not mindful of their duties.
2:04:28
Insurance industry gets $2 billion a year in free premiums, by my estimate that reporting is every year, and it's about 3 billion in premiums on their auto policies.
2:04:38
And because we have a coercive system, this is not a free market.
2:04:43
We are not a free people as our Constitution describes us under a free government, also out of the Constitution.
2:04:51
And they are hurting us, hurting me.
2:04:56
And I'm here to bring relief to myself, looking at in public interest and having high hopes that the court will hear my pleadings as in awful as they may be, for the the general welfare and the general good and for equity.
2:05:13
Thank you, your honor, Thank you so much.
2:05:17
I, the state can respond if you would like or you can rest on your primary arguments.
2:05:22
We'll rest.
2:05:23
We'll all rest.
2:05:25
I'm going to take these motions under advisement.
2:05:28
Rule 12 motions are that they're a difficult standard for moving parties to meet because it presumes everything that's alleged is true, but the court has to look at them in that context.
2:05:43
And so it is important that I'm very clear about whether or not it should be granted and if so, on my basis.
2:05:50
So I'll take those under advisement and issue an order as soon as I can from the meantime.
2:05:58
Mr.
2:05:58
Tulas, you do have the one motion pending.
2:06:02
What I'm going to do is ask you not to set that till I have a chance to rule on these motions.
2:06:07
And then if I deny the motions and the case goes forward, then I'll put a note that that that motion remains pending and, and ask you to contact Miss Carter to to get it set on a motion docket and then notice the other party so it can be set for what motion clerk?
2:06:29
OK, Your honor, question.
2:06:30
Does that mean that you're going to be issuing an order?
2:06:33
And can you just repeat what you said, please?
2:06:36
I'm going to issue an order.
2:06:38
I've got these motions to dismiss under advisement.
2:06:40
You still have that one pending motion because you had filed the amended request today and the other side didn't have an opportunity to respond.
2:06:48
So what I'm saying is that I, I don't want to have that set for hearing until I have a chance to rule on these motions.
2:06:58
And then if I do not grant the motions and the case goes forward, then I'll advise you at the end of that order to please reach out to the clerk's office about setting your motion.
2:07:10
All right, I wish everyone a happy weekend and I hope you get out of here before the weather comes in.
2:07:14
I'm not sure if it's going to or not, but safe travels back to Soddy Daisy as well.
2:07:19
Thank you.
2:07:20
All right.
2:07:32
Quarters adjourned.
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