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East Ridge, notorious for police abuse, served notice intending to decriminalize traffic stops

City attorny Litchford lets front desk clerk accept service of “notice on administrative referral” in radio reporter’s push to enhance officer safety, cut taxpayer lawsuit losses

Dear Mr. Litchford, in the body of this e-mail is service upon the city of East Ridge of the foundational law controlling privilege allegation management under title 55 duplicating my personal service earlier this afternoon.

The corporation is directing police officers to enforce the privilege law using criminal authority, complete with arrest, cuffing, jailing and criminal prosecution, a program of long standing. This notice shows that privilege law, the commissioner of safety’s authority and duty to hold contested case hearings over allegations of licensee wrongdoing, the UAPA and the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies control this process, and that it is improper, illegal and violation of citizen due process rights to impose criminal authority apart from these limits.

Mark Litchford, city attorney for East Ridge, Tenn.

My leading concern is officer safety and taxpayer liability.

If you wish to speak with me about the law’s claims as against East Ridge practice, do not hesitate to contact me.

“Notice on Administrative Referral”

NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REFERRAL OF PRIVILEGE-RELATED ALLEGATIONS SUBJECT TO UAPA

  1. Privilege status. The use of state-created driver licensing to operate a “motor vehicle” on public ways is a state privilege, administered by statute. See Tenn. Const. art. II, § 28 (tax/privilege authority) and T.C.A. Title 55, chapt. 50 (driver licenses).

  2. Administering department. The department of safety and homeland security (“DOSHS”) and its commissioner administer the driving privilege, including licensing, suspension, and revocation. See T.C.A. § 4-3-2005; T.C.A. Title 55, chapt. 50.

  3. Contested-case hearings exist by statute. When the state alleges misuse or grounds to affect a driver license, the legislature provides a contested-case hearing before DOSHS before the commissioner or a designated hearing officer, with judicial review. T.C.A. § 4-3-2005; T.C.A. § 55-50-502, -509, -511 (notice; right to a hearing; review); T.C.A. §§ 4-5-301 to -325, uniform administrative procedures act (“UAPA”), contested cases & review.

  4. Agency primacy. Tennessee law recognizes that licensing questions tied to the use of public highways in commerce are administrative in nature. (“[T]he grant or refusal of a license to use public highways in commerce is purely an administrative question” McMinnville Freight Line, Inc. v. Atkins, 514 S.W.2d 725, 726–27 (Tenn. 1974); “[T]he Utilities Commission has never been held by this Court to be restricted by the technical common law rules of evidence in determining purely administrative questions, and we have held that the grant or refusal of a license to use public highways in commerce is purely an administrative question” Hoover Motor Express Co. v. R.R. & Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 195 Tenn. 593, 616, 261 S.W.2d 233, 243 (1953) (emphasis added).

  5. UAPA authority. Pursuant to T.C.A. § 4-3-2005, a contested case is under UAPA.

  6. Federal compliance mandate. In regulating the use of “every way publicly maintained that is open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel,” the department of safety “shall abide by all federal rules and regulations relative to the issuance, suspension, and revocation of driver licenses and qualification of drivers” T.C.A. § 55-50-504.

  7. Exhaustion of administrative remedies required. Where the legislature vests a department with primary responsibility and supplies a contested-case route with judicial review, parties exhaust administrative remedies before courts exercise coercive power. Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Morgan, 263 S.W.3d 827, 838–39 (Tenn. 2008). Exhaustion protects department primacy where law vests administration in the agency and provides review in chancery or circuit court.

DEMAND

  1. Referral rule. Therefore, upon any allegation tied to misuse or violation of the driving privilege (licensing status, conditions or privilege-based obligation), county employee has no authority but to refer the matter to DOSHS for a UAPA contested case (§§ 4-5-301 to -326 / § 55-50-120) rather than initiate criminal enforcement.

  2. No criminal short-circuit of privilege procedure. Initiating warrantless arrests or criminal prosecutions to adjudicate privilege-status questions short-circuits the statutory administrative channel, defeats the longstanding exhaustion rule and violates due process where law supplies an exclusive remedial path for handling privilege controversies.

  3. Notice given (prior and present). The county and its officers have been served notice regarding (a) the scope and limits of title 55 privilege administration (March 1, 2018) and (b) limits on warrantless arrest authority for non-breach-of-peace matters, T.C.A. § 40-7-103 (April 15, 2020). Instant notice consolidates those notices for present and future reliance.

  4. Instruction to personnel. Effective upon service, the county commission, sheriff, deputies, county attorney, district attorney, county risk manager and all personnel exercising peacekeeping powers under T.C.A. § 8-8-213 each put on awares to refer a privilege-related allegation against a motor vehicle driver/operator to DOSHS for contested-case proceedings that preserve the administrative record for judicial review. T.C.A. § 4-5-319.

  5. Reservation / evidentiary use. Failure to comply with this routing demand will be treated as evidence of deliberate disregard of notice and of agency-channel evasion in any subsequent administrative, civil or appellate proceeding.

  6. Party serving this notice and demand reserves all rights, grants no waiver.

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Drafted by David Jonathan Tulis, ℅ 10520 Brickhill Lane, Soddy-Daisy, TN 37379 Tel. 423-316-2680 Davidtuliseditor@gmail.com

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