Cop due process violation of ‘public offense’ standard in your warrantless arrest
Cops in TN must meet 2 tests, but they use only ‘in the officer’s presence’ test; they overlook the ‘breach of the peace,’ or ‘threatened breach of peace’ requirement
CHATTANOOGA, Tenn., Saturday, Oct. 25, 2025 — I am suing the Hamilton County sheriff to halt “Redcoat warrants,” more commonly known as general warrants, forbidden in the U.S. constitution and state constitutions.
I argue the “public offense” standard in detail in my case before the 6th federal circuit court of appeals. At links below is my brief as to why deputy Brandon Bennett should have obtained a warrant before arresting me for a damaged taillight Nov. 22, 2023. Also, my draft injunction order, explaining the matter from the perspective of the U.S. disctrict court judge.
The case is dismissed in the east Tennessee federal district, but may be remanded back. Whatever happens to the litigtion, the concept of the “public offense” standard is useable in Tennessee in your case, and probably in other states that have exceptions statutes such as T.C.A. 40-7-103, in play in this case, and in my bid to overthrow a major Jim Crow abuse used not just against blacks, but people in general.
Below the link is draft copy of how such a defense might appear in motion or notice of dismissal. It’s not legal advice, just what I’d do if it were me in your situation.
SAMPLE DRAFT LANGUAGE ON
‘PUBLIC OFFENSE’ WARRANTLESS ARREST STANDARD
VIOLATION OF T.C.A. § 40-7-103
Arrest of accused without a warrant violates her rights to due process because she has a right to have judicial oversight and protection prior to arrest, a right of protection the officer also is denied that otherwise protects him and his personal estate from liability for false imprisonment and false arrest based on presumption of his own authority.
The state’s warrantless arrest powers are extensive in T.C.A. § 40-7-103, exceptions to guarantees in the supreme law at Tenn. Const. Art. 1 § 7, “[t]hat the people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions, from unreasonable searches and seizures; and that general warrants, whereby an officer may be commanded to search suspected places, without evidence of the fact committed, or to seize any person or persons not named, whose offences are not particularly described and supported by evidence, are dangerous to liberty, and ought not to be granted” (emphasis added). The United States constitution bans arrest-on-sight or general warrants as “unreasonable,” stating, “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized” U.S. Const. amend. IV (emphasis added).
Accused’s arrest by the states’ privies in the city of Savannah police department constitutes a seizure under a general warrants policy prohibited by law. Hers was an on-sight arrest by an officer acting without judicial sanction whose abduction of accused met only one of the two tests for a warrantless misdemeanor arrest.
Under T.C.A. 40-7-103 warrantless arrest authority given an officer aligns with the common law arrest power recognized as belonging to everyday citizens in T.C.A. § 40-7-109, which lets a citizen make a lawful arrest in a felony or a “public offense.” (1)
The exceptions to the general constitutional requirement are in the nature of emergency or exigency. T.C.A. § 40-7-103’s enumerated exceptions including stalking, suicide attempt and auto accidents involving DUI or flight. Unenumerated exceptions are constrained by the concept of “public offense” or “breach of the peace threatened.”
As in other states, Tennessee’s warrant requirement exists to allow a neutral, unbiased party with judicial authority to grant permission to the officer to affect an arrest. The magistrate or judge “shall examine, on oath, the affiant or affiants, reduce the examination to writing, and cause the examination to be signed by the person making it” T.C.A. § 40-6-203. “The written examination shall set forth the facts stated by the affiant or affiants that establish that there is probable cause to believe an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it,” § 40-6-204. Informants; examination; contents. The arrest process has a requirement that even hearsay have a “substantial basis” for believing its source to be “credible” and with a “factual basis.”
If the magistrate is satisfied from the written examination that there is probable cause to believe the offense complained of has been committed and that there is probable cause to believe the defendant has committed it, then the magistrate shall issue an arrest warrant. The finding of probable cause shall be based on evidence, which may be hearsay in whole or in part; provided, however, that there is a substantial basis for believing the source of the hearsay to be credible and for believing that there is a factual basis for the information furnished.
T.C.A. § 40-6-205. Issuance; probable cause
The warrantless arrest statute orders two tests for the arresting officer:
(a) An officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(1) For a public offense committed or a breach of the peace threatened in the officer’s presence *** (emphasis added)
T.C.A. § 40-7-103
Two tests are required before a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor offense not explicitly mentioned in any of the 11 grounds in T.C.A. § 40-7-103. The officer’s presence is test No. 1. The second test is that of public offense or breach of the peace threatened.
A public offense is a crime whose nature or form is visible. A public offense is one in the nature of a breach of the peace. Statute says “public offense” or “breach of peace threatened.” A public offense is an existing breach of peace. A public offense is a crime that contains the elements of visibility to the human eye; it is disturbance of the peace, uproar, threat, intimidation, spectacle, disturbance, notoriousness, riot, affray, causing alarm, fright, causing sense of imminent danger among members of the public. “The term, ‘breach of the peace’ is generic, and includes riotous and unlawful assemblies, riots, forcible entry and detainer, the sending of challenges and provoking to fight, going around in public, without lawful occasion, in such manner as to alarm the public, the wanton discharge of firearms in the public streets, engaging in an affray or assault, using profane, indecent, and abusive language by one toward another, on a street and in the presence of others, or being intoxicated and yelling on the public streets in such a manner as to disturb the good order and tranquillity of the neighborhood.” State ex rel. Thompson v. Reichman, 135 Tenn. 653, 188 S.W. 225, 229 (1916).
Rules of statutory construction forbid any reading or use of a law that deletes, negates or renders useless any of its provisions. Accuser’s reading of the law — to make the public offense the same as any offense — renders the statute null.
The private property and “[the] person” of the citizen are secured by the warrant requirement. So are the “persons, houses, papers, and effects” of the officer secured from liability as the warrant process shields his estate from claims of harm if the arrest is a botch.
Numerous offenses subject to the right of an accused to a departmental contested case are not public offenses. A license “suspended” after it was expired. Being an insurance industry non-customer. Lack of a tag on an automobile not engaged in privilege taxable activity. A blinkered tag light. A damaged taillight. Failure to indicate direction. Tinted windows.
These are not public offenses, but breaches of agreement between licensor and licensee created in the driver license application process. the party in privilege with the license or metal tag a proof of tax paid for exercise of the privilege. T.C.A.§ 55-50-321. A court would be pressed to imagine when administrative violations under license might cause public fear or dread, or become a public offense under T.C.A. § 40-7-103.
FOOTNOTE
(1)
The exceptions law at Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-7-103 tracks common law arrest authority recognized in Tennessee law as belonging to the citizenry.
(a) A private person may arrest another:
(1) For a public offense committed in the arresting person’s presence;
(2) When the person arrested has committed a felony, although not in the arresting person’s presence; or
(3) When a felony has been committed, and the arresting person has reasonable cause to believe that the person arrested committed the felony.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-7-109 (emphasis added)
Tennessee law
§ 40-7-103. Warrantless arrest; grounds
(a) An officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(1) For a public offense committed or a breach of the peace threatened in the officer’s presence;
(2) When the person has committed a felony, though not in the officer’s presence;
(3) When a felony has in fact been committed, and the officer has reasonable cause for believing the person arrested has committed the felony;
(4) On a charge made, upon reasonable cause, of the commission of a felony by the person arrested;
(5) Who is attempting to commit suicide;
(6) At the scene of a traffic accident who is the driver of a vehicle involved in the accident when, based on personal investigation, the officer has probable cause to believe that the person has committed an offense under title 55, chapters 8 and 10. This subdivision (a)(6) shall not apply to traffic accidents in which no personal injury occurs or property damage is less than one thousand dollars ($1,000), unless the officer has probable cause to believe that the driver of the vehicle has committed an offense under § 55-10-401; [DUI]
(7) Pursuant to § 36-3-619; [Mandatory outpatient proceedings]
(8) Who is the driver of a vehicle involved in a traffic accident either at the scene of the accident or up to four (4) hours after the driver has been transported to a health care facility, if emergency medical treatment for the driver is required and the officer has probable cause to believe that the driver has violated § 55-10-401;
(9) When an officer has probable cause to believe a person has committed the offense of stalking, as prohibited by § 39-17-315;
(10) Who is the driver of a motor vehicle involved in a traffic accident, who leaves the scene of the accident, who is apprehended within four (4) hours of the accident, and the officer has probable cause to believe the driver has violated § 55-10-401; or
(11) Pursuant to § 55-10-119.
(b) If a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a person has violated one (1) or more of the conditions of release imposed pursuant to § 40-11-150, and verifies that the alleged violator received notice of the conditions, the officer shall, without a warrant, arrest the alleged violator regardless of whether the violation was committed in or outside the presence of the officer. [Conditional bail release]
(c) Unless a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed, no officer, except members of the Tennessee highway patrol acting pursuant to § 4-7-104, shall have the authority to stop a motor vehicle for the sole purpose of examining or checking the license of the driver of the vehicle.
Credits
1957 Pub.Acts, c. 82, § 1; 1981 Pub.Acts, c. 401, § 1; 1986 Pub.Acts, c. 754, § 1; 1990 Pub.Acts, c. 980, § 18; 1993 Pub.Acts, c. 484, § 1, eff. July 1, 1993; 1994 Pub.Acts, c. 1002, § 1, eff. July 1, 1994; 1995 Pub.Acts, c. 507, § 7, eff. July 1, 1995; 1999 Pub.Acts, c. 138, § 4, eff. Sept. 1, 1999; 2005 Pub.Acts, c. 296, § 1, eff. July 1, 2005; 2005 Pub.Acts, c. 482, § 2, eff. July 1, 2005; 2012 Pub.Acts, c. 737, § 2, eff. July 1, 2012.
Formerly 1858 Code, § 5037; Shannon’s Code, § 6997; 1932 Code, § 11536; § 40-803.